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This Working Paper has been written in the context of the 1998-1999 European Forum 
programme on Recasting the European Welfare State: Options, Constraints, Actors,
directed by Professors Maurizio Ferrera (Universities of Pavia and Bocconi, Milano) and 
Martin Rhodes (Robert Schuman Centre).
Adopting a broad, long-term and comparative perspective, the Forum will aim to:
• scrutinize the complex web of social, economic and political challenges to contemporary 
European welfare states;
• identify the various options for, and constraints on institutional reform;
■ discuss the role of the various actors in promoting or hindering this reform at the national, 
sub-national and supra-national level;
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The 1996 reform of the welfare system is widely recognized as a turning point 
in American social policy. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRA) of 1996 eliminated Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) and replaced it with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF), thus ending the entitlement of poor single parents to social assistance, 
only firmly established in the 1960s and 1970s. What is the significance of this 
change? What forces might account for this policy shift? As a historical 
sociologist, I am well aware that the owl of Minerva flies at dusk - and it’s still 
light out, metaphorically speaking, for welfare reform. There has been no 
dearth of commentary on the meaning of welfare reform for our public life, as 
liberals and feminists have decried the shredding of a public safety net, linking 
welfare reform to the despised political status of welfare recipients and poor 
single mothers and children of color. Others reserve judgement until the next 
economic downturn hits, with greater or lesser degrees of pessimism about the 
possibilities. Conservative commentators, however, proclaim that "welfare 
reform is working," pointing to the precipitous decline in the welfare rolls - the 
number of people on welfare has declined by 27% since the legislation was 
signed into law in August of 1996 (Pear 1998). They assume that former 
recipients have found employment or, at least, family members to help them 
out. It is this outcome - shifting responsibility for citizens’ and residents’ 
welfare to the private spheres of labor market and family - that they intended to 
achieve, whatever else it may do in terms of former recipients’ standards of 
living and well-being. They contend that this privatization of responsibilities 
ultimately will prove beneficial to all, even if by preventing the formation of 
some families in the first place. But as yet, there have been few analyses of the 
significance of welfare reform in terms of gender relations. I take such an 
analysis - however preliminary - to be my charge. I will offer an assessment of 
the character of the changes, and their significance for gender relations, as well 
as assessing some possible explanations for the timing and character of these 
policy developments.
I want to note that welfare reform is but one part of what is happening 
politically to gender relations, to women, and to poor mothers, even within the 
system of income support, in the United States. Of particular importance within 
income support is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which is having 
noticeable and positive effects on the incomes of poor employed parents, 
especially single mothers. Unlike AFDC, the EITC has been expanded several 
times over the course of the 1980s and 1990s. The EITC offers assistance to 
employed parents through the tax system rather than the welfare system. It also 
differs from AFDC in that claims for support to families are not based on 
caregiving and low income (so low as to preclude employment), but on low 
wages from employment coupled with parental status. Thus, families are 



























































































transfers.' In this paper, I will not go into why the EITC has been expanded (but 
see Myles and Pierson 1997; Weaver 1998). However, I will make reference to 
the ways in which the EITC and associated employment-related policies are 
affecting poor mothers. One can note that the factors behind the collapse of 
AFDC are not entirely the same as those responsible for the expansion of the 
EITC, although of course there are general contextual factors in common, such 
as the pressures of a balanced budget. The politics of EITC expansion have 
differed considerably from the politics of welfare reform, but are also distinct 
from the politics associated with the post-World War II expansion of welfare 
state programs. In contrast to the heat of the welfare debates, EITC was 
expanded largely through a "politics of stealth," in which change has been 
carried out in the course of complicated budget packages not easily accessible 
to public scrutiny (Myles and Pierson 1997).
Before I go any further, let me clarify for non-U.S. readers some of the 
terminology used in these political debates. U.S. politics is correctly seen as 
heavily focused on rights. Yet political and civil rights have been more 
prominent in U.S. political discourse than have "social rights," a term which is 
not widely used outside of some academic discussions of welfare states. Indeed, 
the term "welfare state" is not used in popularly (or even in many academic 
discussions - those of economists, for example). Rather, Americans 
differentiate between "welfare," meaning means-tested social assistance, 
particularly AFDC, and "Social Security", near-universal contributory 
retirement and medical coverage for retired elderly workers and their 
dependents - Old Age, Survivors’ and Disability Insurance and Medicare 
(Orloff 1993a, chap.l; Skocpol 1988). While Social Security has much of the 
positive connotation attaching to social rights elsewhere, welfare has been 
politically vilified, particularly over the last two decades, and is a very 
unpopular set of programs. Many conservatives have been opposed to any sort 
of social spending. However, elite attempts to deprive Social Security of its 
legitimacy as a part of a drive to privatize retirement provision have been less 
successful than attempts to scale back social assistance for the working-aged 
population. One aspect of their campaign has been to popularize the term 
"entitlement" to refer to legislated government commitments to particular 
constituencies. Conservatives blame "entitlements" for causing budget deficits 
current and projected, and for threatening the bankruptcy of Social Security by 
giving benefits to middle-class people who do not need support, at the cost of 
high (and "unfair") payroll taxes on younger people (Skocpol 1995). But while 
Social Security’s popular support has not been substantially undermined, the
1 While in reality many AFDC recipients worked, this was unofficial (Edin and Lein 1996) - and 





























































































term "entitlement," with its whiff - however faint - of "undeservingness," has 
come to be the preferred term for all benefit programs in which spending is 
automatic, based on legislated criteria, rather than being subject to 
Congressional approval in each budget cycle (as is so-called "discretionary 
spending"). Finally, let me note that reformers interested in rolling back the role 
of the state in social provision are called "neo-liberal" in many places, but are 
usually referred to as "conservatives" in the U.S. Those defending some role, 
albeit a residual one, for the state in alleviating market failures or pursuing 
public purposes outside national defense and crime control are "liberals" in the 
U.S., while elsewhere they would likely be referred to as "social liberals."
I will argue that welfare reform should be understood as incorporating at 
least three distinct components: it eliminates a social right; it eliminates 
caregiving as a base for making claims within the U.S. welfare state; and it 
marks a shift in institutionalized expectations about mothers’ employment. 
First, the Personal Responsibility Act accomplished a shift in institutional 
relationships. By replacing an entitlement, or social right, to assistance, 
however encumbered with restrictions, with benefits granted on a discretionary 
basis, the state forces citizens and residents toward reliance on "private" 
sources of support, the labor market, families and charities. This withdrawal of 
social rights affects all citizens, but especially groups which historically have 
depended disproportionately on public assistance: single mothers with poor 
earnings capacities and heavy caregiving burdens, and racial and ethnic 
minority people, who suffer from relatively high rates of poverty and 
unemployment. The EITC does offer public support to families in a non- 
discretionary manner, but only to those who are in the labor market and earning 
wages.
Second, the new policy arrangements eliminate support for caregiving 
and reproduction when they are not linked to participation in the labor market. 
Caregiving has been shifted to an even more marginal status within the US 
policy regime, as claims based on the status of family caregiver have been 
eliminated. While funding for child care services has been expanded, it remains 
insufficient to meet demand, and support for high-quality services has not yet 
been forthcoming. Moreover, political understandings of the demands of 
caregiving are rather thin - responsibilities for caring for children are usually 
relegated to the status of barriers to labor market participation. Because the 
only public support to caregiving and reproduction is now linked to 
employment, those groups with disproportionately high rates of non­
employment are disadvantaged by this shift. For those who cannot get the 
limited public support for care services, the availability and quality of care 
depend on market resources - thus disadvantaging those with jobs paying 




























































































families of color; both men and women of color have higher rates of 
unemployment and underemployment than do whites. But although driven 
partly by racial politics, welfare reform operates to affect race relations through 
a formally race-neutral legal apparatus that eliminates social rights and support 
to full-time caregiving for all and imposes work requirements on all who apply 
for state assistance.
Third, this round of welfare reform accomplished a shift in the 
institutionalized expectations about the gender division of labor, in that women 
- or, more to the point, mothers - as well as men are now to be subject to the 
requirement of employment or work activities in claiming social assistance. 
Thus, the end of an entitlement to social assistance is coincident with a shift in 
formal expectations about women’s employment and a withdrawal of (residual) 
support to full-time caregiving. While some see work requirements for single 
mothers as indistinguishable from ending the social assistance safety net, one 
can imagine social rights based on employment for mothers as for all citizens 
and encompassing protections for caregiving, as for example, in Scandinavia or 
France (Hobson 1994). (This is not to say there are not other features of the 
gender order in these countries about which a gender-egalitarian might be 
concerned - high levels of occupational sex segregation, for example.) But in 
the US - as in the other predominantly English-speaking countries often called 
"liberal" regimes - there has been emphasis on the importance of "choice" for 
women, not just in the arena of reproduction, but vis-à-vis arrangements for 
employment and caregiving. And clearly, these policy changes have brought 
about an end to publicly-subsidized choice for poor mothers as to their 
employment and caregiving arrangements in the United States.
These shifts have pushed the United States further down a distinctive 
trajectory of policy development, in which: (1) social spending is skewed 
toward the elderly, and social rights for working-aged population and families 
with young children are relatively undeveloped, while market provision is both 
politically supported and quite extensive, albeit uneven in coverage and quality; 
(2) public financial support for caregiving, either by mothers in the home, or by 
publicly-provided child care, is very limited; and (3) there is a high degree of 
"gender sameness" in the institutionalized expectations about men's and 
women's employment, and public policies have helped to open substantial 
employment opportunities for many women. (Since caregiving is left to the 
private sphere almost entirely, continuing gender imbalances in the division of 
caregiving and domestic work are usually not understood as matters for 
political intervention.) Thus, while welfare reform represents a reaction by U.S. 
policymakers to factors similar to those experienced elsewhere, and is fed by 
currents of neo-liberal thinking that are fashionable in many places, it remains a 




























































































to caregiving, and of employment as the basis for claims for social support.
How can we explain this set of changes? One might examine electoral 
and legislative politics. We can attribute all three shifts to the 1994 Republican 
victory in the House of Representatives which followed then-candidate Bill 
Clinton’s popular 1992 promise to "end welfare as we know it," itself developed 
in response to Republicans’ successful use of welfare as a "wedge issue" to 
divide Democratic constituencies in the 1980s. Clinton’s stance opened the way 
for consideration of radical reforms of social assistance, includ.ng time limits 
on welfare receipt and the requirement that mothers be engaged in work 
activities, which even President Reagan had been unable to accomplish, while 
the Republicans’ 1994 victory allowed them to press forward in their quest to 
legislate deterrent welfare reform, embodied in the Personal Responsibility Act. 
Looking at the problem historically, we could trace the development and 
growing political power in the 1970s and 1980s of a group of conservatives for 
whom ending welfare and cutting back government spending were central 
preoccupations; important pieces of their program were adopted - in different 
forms - by important actors in the two major parties in the 1980s. I am 
interested in exploring more structural explanations, and do not go into a 
detailed analysis of party politics and legislative maneuvering around the 
welfare bill, as has been done recently and ably by Weaver (1998). Here, it is 
important to say that the factors responsible for eliminating entitlement are not 
exactly the same as those which might be invoked to explain the shifts in 
expectations about women’s work, and the ways in which support to 
reproduction and caregiving has come to be more tightly linked with 
employment.
The elimination of a social right or entitlement can be linked to social 
balances of power. Among social scientists, there has long been a tendency to 
understand the relative weakness of social rights and the lack of generosity of 
American social programs for non-elderly people and the tight linkage of 
benefits to employment with reference to the political and organizational 
weakness of working-class forces and the concomitant strength of employers 
vis-a-vis workers and states (e.g, Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987; Korpi and 
Palme 1998). Others have emphasized the significance of liberalism as an 
ideological and cultural force - a preference for private provision and for 
minimizing state interventions, reflected in relatively low social spending and 
pressures to keep taxes low. Many analysts see such forces gaining ground with 
the liberalization of financial markets and increased capital mobility often 
referred to in shorthand as "globalization" (Rhodes 1996; Esping-Andersen 
1996). More recently, as racial and gender factors have come to be understood 
as significant for policy outcomes, the strength of racism and gender 




























































































figured in explanations for the character of US social policy. Thus, for instance, 
in The Color of Welfare, Jill Quadagno (1994) has described the ways in which 
racism and the competition for favorable positions and access to public 
resources undermined struggles for racial justice and weakened public support 
for the welfare system in the 1960s and 1970s, as that system came to be 
understood as a system for minorities (a process she calls the "racialization" of 
welfare). And today, there is little doubt that welfare politics has served as a 
mechanism for some whites’ expression of racial antagonisms toward African 
Americans (Gilens 1996). Racism - in combination with the residual character 
of social provision for working-aged families and the fact that AFDC was 
understood as subsidizing undesirable behaviors - has contributed to the 
weakness of welfare beneficiaries as a political constituency.
It has become commonplace to mention women’s increased labor force 
participation and changing family and household forms as relevant for policy 
outcomes, specifically the fact that social assistance for mothers has 
increasingly been conditioned on work activities or employment.2 These are 
certainly important factors, even if they are typically understood outside the 
context of gender relations. Women’s increased employment is usually seen 
simply a non-problematic aspect of modernization and "progress". What 
changes in expectations about employment may mean for women’s caregiving 
responsibilities are usually dealt with by referring to the need for enhanced 
child care services.
Feminist analysts have given greater attention to the links between the 
gender division of labor within households, in which women have the bulk of 
responsibility for caregiving and domestic work, and patterns of women’s labor 
force participation (e.g., their overrepresentiation in part-time or irregular 
employment). They also have been concerned with the ways in which activities 
associated with women - particularly caregiving - are both socially necessary 
and institutionally denigrated. (For reviews of this literature, see Orloff 1996; 
O’Connor 1996.) For some feminist analysts (e.g., Mink 1998), the elimination 
of AFDC and the associated requirement for mothers to be employed coupled 
with the elimination of caregiving as a recognized basis for claiming social 
assistance is the ultimate act of institutionalized gender discrimination. Others - 
myself included - are more sympathetic to the notion of expecting work from
2 Changing family forms spark social-scientific debate and concern, reflecting conflict about 
women’s household autonomy and gender power, yet most analysts concede that single-parent 
families and other household forms are here to stay, whatever their moral and ideological 
evaluation of them. This implies that such households will have to be supported - by mothers 
working more, fathers contributing increased child support, or government continuing to offer 




























































































all adults, but remain concerned about the inattention to real dilemmas of 
caregiving and employment, the lack of support to caregiving work, and the 
poor quality and inadequate funding afforded child care services. Yet in both 
cases, the unequal valuation of caregiving and employment as embodied in 
welfare reform’s inadequate guarantees for quality child care services or 
parental leave is understood as reflecting a gendered imbalance of power. And 
it is clear that increasing employment among mothers, particularly in the 
context of a low-wage labor market, has caused some of the rethinking of the 
bases for social assistance, even if there is disagreement about how greater 
demands for mothers’ employment should be evaluated.
I do not wish to argue that these forces are not significant in the recent 
ensemble of changes - for clearly they are. But welfare reform is not simply a 
reflection of social and political powerlessness of women, the poor, and people 
of color; nor is it a straightforward adaptation to the realities of mothers’ 
employment. Gender relations and race relations affected policy developments 
in other ways as well, including through the political mobilization and 
economic successes of some women of all races and some men of color, and the 
political responses these encourage. For example, there is not just the 
"backlash" phenomenon of right-wing talk-show hosts or politicians 
complaining about "feminazis", "unfair" racial preferences in affirmative 
action, or welfare-supported "illegitimacy." Other politicians attempt to win the 
votes of "soccer moms" or Christian housewives through welfare and other 
social policies. Democrats want to keep African Americans tied to their party, 
while some Republicans may try to carve out social policies which will give at 
least the appearance of racial fairness (probably more significant for not 
alienating white moderates than winning black votes). Recent developments in 
social theory recognize heterogeneity within social categories, with important 
implications for the politics of social policy. As Pringle and Watson (1992, 
p.69) put it, "If we include a perspective of heterogeneity of women and of 
feminist response, no one policy will be a gain for all women"; the same could 
be said for other categories, including (but not limited to) those based on race 
or class. The greater divergence of interests and identities among women, and, 
to a somewhat more limited degree, among people of color, which has followed 
the ending of de jure discrimination and expansion of employment 
opportunities in the 1960s through 1980s has mattered for welfare politics in 
the 1990s. I
I want to incorporate both social balances of power and constellations of 
interests within an historical and institutionalist argument. Relations of race, 
class and gender shaped welfare reform, to be sure - but as mediated by the 
policy legacy and the larger political-institutional context. The particularities of 




























































































Act, and its timing, cannot be understood without reference to the policy 
legacy, and the political processes it has engendered (Weir, Orloff and Skocpol 
1988; Pierson 1994, 1996; Esping-Andersen 1996). Analysts agree that one 
must examine existing policy regime characteristics to understand how 
countries respond distinctively to forces for change, which may be similar 
cross-nationally (e.g., internationalization of labor markets or liberalization of 
financial markets in the current era). Of particular significance, they note that 
the entire regime - including the role of private provision - must be taken into 
account in understanding policy developments. All note that the restricted 
character of public social provision and the large role of employer provision for 
the working-aged population in the U.S. undermine popular support for the 
residual public programs. Yet to date, analyses based on path dependency and 
policy feedback have tended to ignore gender. Thus, for example, in his 
discussion of AFDC and the British Income Support, Pierson (1994) never 
discusses the impact of national differences in expectations about women’s 
employment - a significant aspect of the gender division of labor - as relevant 
for the fates of these programs (this is one of the issues taken up in O’Connor, 
Orloff and Shaver 1999).
I build on this type of institutionalist analysis to consider the gendered 
and racialized characteristics of policy regimes, and of the politics that emerge 
around them. To explain the gendered aspects of policy outcomes, one must 
take into account the whole set of state interventions around gender relations. 
In the analysis I present here, I draw on the recently-completed book, States, 
Markets, Families: Gender, Liberalism and Social Policy in Australia, Canada, 
Great Britain, and the United States, which I have co-authored with Julia 
O’Connor and Sheila Shaver (1999). We present an analysis of the larger 
gender policy regime in the U.S. and other "liberal" states, assessing policies in 
the areas of income support, employment, and regulation of reproduction. In the 
present effort, I go into greater analytic depth about the specifics of welfare 
reform and gender relations.
Many aspects of the U.S. gender policy regime - the interventions around 
employment and reproduction especially - are based on the fact that women as 
well as men are employed (even if patterns of employment differ). The 
significant policy successes in the realm of opening employment opportunities 
to women, along with rising real wages and employers’ demand for women’s 
labor, have amplified the forces, including women’s own aspirations, leading to 
women’s increased rates of paid employment. Furthermore, many women - 
especially single mothers - have benefited over the last decade from the 
enhanced economic possibilities of employment due to the expansion of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit and the rise in the minimum wage (Kilbom 1997). 




























































































Nelson 1984, 1990; Mink 1998; Fraser 1989) have highlighted the bifurcated 
form of the U.S. welfare state, in which women are the principal clientele of the 
"lower", social assistance tier where claims have been based on caregiving. The 
implicit assumption is that because women are disproportionately responsible 
for care and domestic work, all women should have had an interest in 
preserving and improving the treatment of such claims. But these analyses, 
while highlighting the significance for social policy of the gender division of 
labor and the concomitant unequal valuation of caregiving and employment, 
fail to attend to the overall shape of the U.S. social policy regime - particularly 
neglecting the ways in which the large role of private provision and the market 
shape social politics. (Thus, the inadequacies of this mode of analysis are 
roughly the mirror of those of the institutionalists). For most mothers, even 
single ones, are employed, and they must get by without significant public 
support - in these circumstances, the tightly targeted character of public income 
support combined with its explicit support for full-time caregiving and non­
employment (even though many recipients in fact were employed) left the 
constituency depending on welfare a very limited one. (The racialization of 
AFDC, meaning the ways in which it has been politically linked to racial 
politics, further undermined political support among some white elites and 
voters.) Finally, to the extent that state interventions are tied to equality 
projects, they are informed by understanding of women’s equality as tied to 
employment and economic independence rather than to rewarding women 
based on their distinctive caregiving activities (O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 
1999). Thus, it was at best difficult and, more often, not politically compelling, 
for many political actors generally committed to women’s equality to defend 
AFDC strongly.
Both the generally market-supporting and - enhancing character of the 
US policy regime and the particular articulation of gender equality projects 
with women’s labor market participation helped to create a context within 
which welfare reform was likely to take a form which would support 
employment. But this did not necessarily imply that social assistance had to 
lose its status as a (conditional) entitlement. The neo-liberal thinking in favor 
among political elites helped to ensure that welfare reform would encompass 
some shift of responsibilities from state to labor market, and tie assistance to 
work activities or to employment - so as to support, rather than undercut, the 
low-wage labor market. But again, this did not necessitate an end of 
entitlement. Flere, we must look to the specific political and policy dynamics of 




























































































WHAT KIND OF WELFARE REFORM?
Welfare reform - which since at least the Reagan administration has meant 
increasing restrictions and work requirements, occasionally with enhanced 
child care services or training, or even abolishing AFDC (Murray 1984) - has 
been a politically popular proposal among Republicans and many Democrats. 
Politicians and policymakers tended to agree about the problems to which 
welfare reform could be a solution - "illegitimacy", worklessness and long-term 
"welfare dependency". They agreed as well on solutions when pitched at the 
most general level - restore "family values", promote employment, and lower 
rates of nonmarital childbearing, especially among teens. Even time limits came 
to be a point of agreement at the general level when then-Presidential candidate 
Bill Clinton embraced Harvard economist, later undersecretary of Health and 
Human Services, David Ell wood’s (1988) proposal for a two-year limit on 
spells of welfare receipt without some type of work activity - a limit that in 
Ellwood’s proposal was to be combined with significant supports to mothers 
undertaking employment, health insurance and public employment jobs of last 
resort.3
There were considerable differences between the parties, and within 
them, over how time limits and work requirements would actually wprk, some 
of which may be characterized in shorthand as "hard" versus "soft". The 
"hardness" of time limits and work requirements reflects the ease and extent to 
which recipients might be exempted from the requirements, for example, by 
virtue of good-faith efforts to find employment. There were also differences in 
terms of how the program would deal with non-marital childbearing; "hard" 
provisions would bring lifetime exclusions of benefits to children bom out of 
wedlock to mothers under 18 while "softer" provisions would require only that 
teen mothers on benefits live with a "responsible" adult. The question of how 
much caregiving would be accommodated in demands for recipients to be 
employed - including whether women (or male caregivers) on social assistance 
should have a choice to stay at home full time to care for young children - was a 
core part of the debate.4 (While social conservatives extolled housewifery for 
married women, this did not extend to unmarried women.) Whether the
3 I remember serving on an "Author Meets Critics” panel on Ellwood’s book at the 1989 
meeting of the American Sociological Association when my fellow panelist Fran Piven 
predicted - correctly - that it would be only the time limits in Ellwood’s proposal that would 
survive.
4 It is arguable that a consensus around the necessity of single mothers’ employment was 
reached by the time of the 1988 Family Support Act, which made some significant changes in 
AFDC (Naples 1997). But for various reasons, not least of which was the rise in the welfare 
rolls after the FSA was implemented, this reform was not sufficient to slake the thirst for 




























































































program would continue to be an entitlement, albeit one subject to increased 
requirements, was also at issue. Which version of welfare reform prevailed - 
Clinton’s, liberal Congressional Democrats’, or Republicans’ - was determined 
in the course of the partisan maneuvering during the Clinton’s first 
administration, the 103rd and 104th Congresses. In the end, entitlement was 
eliminated, and hard time limits and work requirements were enacted, with very 
little accommodation to caregiving responsibilities. However, the "hard" anti- 
"illegitimacy" provisions were not included in the final bill. One might simplify 
somewhat and say that in the clear shift from public to private responsibility, it 
has been the labor market part of the "private" which is being emphasized 
politically more than is family.
Welfare was a key "wedge issue" used by Republicans against Democrats 
throughout the 1980s. (One welfare politics in the 1980s and 1990s, I have 
relied especially on Weir (1998) and Weaver (1998). Republican politicians 
were able to blend facts and fiction successfully to cast welfare recipients as 
undeserving evaders of work and family responsibilities in the minds of many 
voters (Gilens 1996). Republicans campaigned "against welfare" - calling for 
sanctions, spending limits and an end to "fraud" - for years, with great electoral 
success but little to show in the way of policy changes that actually did more 
than tinker at the margins of social policy. Democrats were put in the 
unenviable position of defending a deeply-flawed welfare program in order to 
defend poor people and a safety net, and lost support among traditional white 
working-class constituencies, among others, because of it. Democrats, 
particularly those associated with the Democratic Leadership Council, 
including then-Govemor Bill Clinton, wanted to "inoculate” their party on 
welfare (and other wedge issues) by adopting a different approach. And Clinton 
did manage to turn around his party’s vulnerability among white voters in his 
famous 1992 campaign pledge to "end welfare as we know it". Democrats were 
split by Clinton’s approach, though in the end most felt they had to go along 
with it; the electoral power of this approach is reflected in Republicans’ 
complaint that Clinton had stolen his welfare reform ideas from them. And it 
may well have made outright elimination of AFDC more likely as Republican 
congressmen moved even further to the right to differentiate themselves from 
Clinton, who was already embracing many "tough" provisions (Weaver 1998, 
P-379).
The key aspect of Clinton’s approach to welfare was to require welfare 
recipients to work, or engage in work-like activities, training or education, after 
two years of receiving benefits, although with various guarantees of child care 
and public employment if jobs were not to be found (Ellwood 1996). While 
Clinton administration officials evidenced some concern about poverty, 




























































































raising benefits, but on getting everyone - including mothers - employed and 
then improving pay and employment conditions. In essence, Clinton Democrats 
wanted to make AFDC more like unemployment insurance or active-labor- 
market programs - a short-term benefit to help claimants "get on their feet" but 
pushing all into the labor market through the stick of short benefit duration and 
the carrot of job training, day care subsidies and health insurance. In fact, this is 
how many women were using the program, although the formal rules obscured 
this. This policy orientation complemented other policies designed to "make 
work pay" (the phrase was originally Ellwood’s [1988]), such as enhancing the 
Earned Income Tax Credit, increasing the minimum wage, expanding training 
and educational access and creating universal health insurance access. Two 
components of the Clinton plan were novel: time limits, and employment 
requirements that applied to mothers as well as fathers among all segments of 
the population. Yet it is worth noting that Ellwood (1988) had proposed half­
time, rather than full-time, work for single parents, in recognition of their 
specific caregiving responsibilities; this feature was carried over into Clinton’s 
proposed bill - which also allowed for mothers to remain out of employment 
while caring for infants.
The policy preferences of the Democrats looked like a less generous and 
residual version of Sweden’s or France’s supports for single mothers, which also 
require paid work after children reach age three, although in the context of far 
greater public support for all employed parents and for caregiving generally 
(Eardley et al 1996, pp.150-51; Lewis 1997; Duncan and Edwards 1997; Siim 
1990; Leira 1992). Their approaches are all premised on the idea that most 
citizens are earners, some are caregivers, but to combine employment and 
caregiving, state support, such as parental leave, child care and supplemental 
income, is needed, particularly for vulnerable populations such as poor single 
mothers. Yet the Democrats’ proposed programs were distinctively liberal in the 
sense that state support was to be residual - for the majority of the population, 
services are to be privately purchased and leaves are to be financed through 
savings or employers, while public supports were to be limited to the welfare 
population and the working poor. (In this way, they are somewhat less residual 
than the Republicans, who want everything targeted on the poorest as tightly as 
possible).
Concern with "illegitimacy" has been central to Republican rhetoric 
about welfare.5 Provisions that were seen to crack down on "deviant" family 
behaviors were considered useful in keeping social conservative constituencies
5 Although divorced parents spark their concern as well, policy proposals to curb divorce are 





























































































such as the Christian Coalition, attached to the Republican Party, particularly 
when the party was not delivering policy successes on issues like outlawing 
abortion (Weaver 1998). The Republicans’ initial welfare bill included both 
hard time limits and hard anti-illegitimacy provisions which would undercut the 
capacities of poor women to have and support children. Indeed, conservative 
welfare guru Charles Murray - who had in 1984 issued the call for eliminating 
AFDC "as a thought experiment" when it was considered politically impossible 
(Murray 1984) - proposed the idea of funding orphanages from savings gained 
from cutting off mothers with "illegitimate" children - an alternative which he 
portrayed as better for the children than their mothers’ care (Murray 1994). 
Deterrent mandates vis-a-vis recipients’ reproductive behavior and marital 
choices were to be imposed on the states. These included the denial of 
additional benefits for children bom while beneficiaries are claiming social 
assistance - the so-called "family cap,” a ban on children for whom paternity 
was not established and most severely, a lifetime ban on aid to children bom to 
unwed mothers under eighteen unless the mother married someone who would 
take on financial responsibility for the child (Weaver 1998, pp.384-391. In the 
end, the hardline Republicans, mostly in the House, could not muster the 
support to include these provisions as federal mandates, even in their own 
party. Senate Republicans were somewhat more moderate than their House 
counterparts, while Republican governors rejected the mandatory character of 
these provisions, preferring to craft deterrent measures to suit their own 
electoral and administrative exigencies. Finally, anti-abortion activists voiced 
concern that such provisions would increase abortions. Thus, these "family 
values" provisions were left to state option.6
Both the initial Republican bills and the finally-enacted PRA ended 
entitlement to social assistance, eliminating AFDC, and sharply reduced all 
funding for the non-elderly poor while turning federal welfare funds into block 
grants to the states. While promoting state-level administration of all welfare 
programs (for the non-elderly), the Republicans supported strict lifetime limits 
on assistance, and aimed to make welfare unbearable or unobtainable as a way 
of enforcing paid work or family ties on poor mothers. (The Democrats initially 
wanted directly to promote work, e.g., through offering public jobs.) This is 
gender "sameness" with a vengeance - requiring single mothers to rely on the 
market without any public supports results in great inequities, given their 
disproportionate share of the caregiving burden and the ways in which this 
affects employment prospects. Indeed, this is really a view in which making
6 The issue of the link between "family caps" and increased abortions among women on welfare 
has not gone away. For example, a recent report showing that New Jersey’s family cap probably 
had raised welfare recipients’ abortion rates has caused controversy among policymakers and 




























































































mothers do paid work is a form of punishment, which helps to explain why 
these reformers were so uninterested in making paid work a viable way for 
single mothers to support themselves and their children. The point is precisely 
to make it impossible or extremely difficult to do so; in their view, poor single 
women really do not have a right to bear children (Jencks and Edin 1995). This 
is the logic of the poor law, which attempted to use the mechanism of market 
discipline to curb childbearing by single women and the poor generally. And 
one might well infer that they are succeeding from the growth in the gap in 
abortion rates between welfare recipients and other women - a gap that was 
already quite large: a New Jersey study reported welfare recipients having 
abortion rates of 29 per 1000 women, while women not receiving assistance 
have a rate of 3 per 1000 (Lewin 1998).
For some time now, the Republican platform has included provisions that 
would limit women’s decisional autonomy in the areas of sexuality, fertility and 
family formation. Some would like to prevent motherhood outside of marriage 
altogether (even for those, who, like the fictional Murphy Brown who won Dan 
Quayle’s opprobrium, can afford to support themselves through employment). 
But there are differences between these social conservatives who target 
"legitimacy" as the source of all social ills (e.g., Murray 1994) and "laissez- 
faire feminists" (the phrase comes from Klatch 1990), who do not want state 
subsidies or regulation of personal behavior. Yet neither group was (or is) 
willing to commit state resources to supporting men’s wages or women’s 
caretaking work. Rather than promoting state subsidization of the breadwinner 
family (save through tax cuts), social conservatives - the controlling faction of 
the Republican Party in the 1990s - have attempted to legislate regulations 
based on a traditional moral code, emphasizing the restriction of access to 
abortion. They have also supported eliminating public services and benefits in 
the expectation that this will prevent women from having children out of 
wedlock or deciding to divorce. But market discipline is not preventing non- 
marital births or divorces, a marked shift from the period of the poor law when 
women’s employment opportunities and possibilities for economic 
independence were far more constricted than they are today. "Laissez-faire 
feminists" and other social libertarians in the Republican Party are not 
particularly interested in legislating public interference with the decisions of 
women and men who are not relying on welfare assistance. For them, the logic 
of the market includes its capacity to buy personal freedom - with the corollary 
that reproductive freedom - including the right to have children or not - is 
available only if one has material resources.
Before discussing welfare reform in analytic terms, let me describe what 
I take to be some of the important features of the bill that finally succeeded: the 




























































































The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
AFDC has been replaced with a block grant, Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF), for new state-run welfare programs; it is accompanied by a 
child care block grant. (Information on the PRA is obtained from the Green 
Book published by the US House of Representatives Committee on Ways and 
Means [US CWM] 1996, pp. 1325-1417, supplemented by coverage from the 
New York Times and Washington Post.) Under the provisions of the Social 
Security Act which created the Aid to Dependent Children program, which later 
became AFDC, the federal government offered matching funds to state- 
administered programs that meet specific federally-set criteria, including 
entitlement to assistance if eligibility criteria were met. (On the history of 
ADC/AFDC, see Bell 1965.) AFDC was available to divorced, deserted, or 
never-married single parents (or other caretakers) of children under age 18 with 
few assets and very low incomes - so low that employment was almost always 
precluded. Indeed, the logic of the program was to allow full-time caregiving of 
children. The states, especially in the South, initially resisted organizing social 
assistance as a categorical entitlement, but court decisions in response to 
welfare activism of the 1960s and 1970s forced them to do so. The new law 
eliminates this entitlement to social assistance, and mandates that adults 
receiving assistance be required to engage in. work activities (paid or subsidized 
employment, community service employment, or approved training) after two 
years (less at state option) and that there be a five-year lifetime limit on cash 
benefits (less at state option); states must also have increasing proportions of 
their caseloads engaged in work activities over several years after the law’s 
passage (US CWM 1996, pp. 1334-35). States decide other eligibility criteria, 
benefit levels and specific work requirements, but there is no guarantee of 
assistance even if these criteria are met given that funding is not assured or 
mandated.
A key difference between the original AFDC and TANF is that the latter 
makes few concessions to caregiving in imposing work requirements. The 
original AFDC program was designed to allow single mothers to stay at home 
to care for minor children; provisions encouraging employment for some 
segments of the clientele began to appear in the mid-1960s. With changes 
brought about by the 1988 Family Support Act, all AFDC parents - mothers as 
well as fathers - with children three years of age and above were required to 
work or undergo training, and states had the option of imposing the work 
requirement on parents of children as young as one year. This makes clear that 
women were expected to combine parenting and paid work, a dramatically 
different "model of motherhood", to use Leira’s (1992) phrase, from that 
embodied in the original Social Security Act of 1935. This has become clearer 




























































































parents of children beyond the first twelve weeks of life. (Basically, recipients 
get the time equivalent of the [unpaid] family leave mandated by the federal 
government on large employers). Parents of pre-school children who cannot 
find child care are exempted from work requirements, and states may exempt 
parents of children under age one. However, determinations of what is 
"acceptable" child care are already at issue (Swarns 1998).
AFDC benefits varied across states, and will continue to do so under 
TANF. But benefits did not bring recipients up to the US poverty level (about 
40% of median income), although in some states, in combination with Food 
Stamps, they have come closer than in others. Even when benefits are 
combined with other sources of income, AFDC recipients suffered many 
material hardships - but, according to one recent study, fewer than do employed 
poor single mothers (Edin and Lein 1996). State-run programs under TANF can 
vary more widely, and it is possible that some states’ initiatives allowing 
parents to combine employment, assistance, child support and services for some 
period of time, will be more likely to bring them above poverty level. But, 
again, there is no guarantee of this, and states can also allow recipients to 
remain in poverty on or off the social assistance rolls. If parents can get private 
employment, however, they will be eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit, 
which in combination with even minimum-wage earnings will bring many 
employed parents and their children above the poverty line (Dionne 1998; 
Corbett 1998).
While the most onerous family-related restrictions and bans were not 
enacted, provisions to increase child support enforcement and paternity 
establishment were strengthened, and the law included some symbolic 
measures such as bonuses to the states which most reduce their rates of 
nonmarital births without raising abortion rates. Child support and paternity 
provisions require custodial parents to cooperate with state efforts to establish 
and enforce child support obligations, and, if necessary, paternity; they attempt 
to enforce income-sharing on men and women without custody of their children 
(these provisions are gender-neutral in targeting non-custodial parents, 
although the majority of these are men). Under AFDC regulations, all child 
support collected, save for a $50 pass-through, went to the state to offset 
benefits paid to the custodial parent and her children, reflecting the overriding 
concern with social expenditures that has motivated these policies. Many 
poorer men and women see little gain for their children’s well-being from 
cooperating with authorities, while informal support to mothers from children’s 
fathers has often been an important component of their income (Edin and Lein
1996). Under the new TANF regulations, states no longer have to pass on the 
first $50 collected. Most are keeping all child support collected, others are 




























































































With passing on the entire amount collected (Focus 1998). Feminist critics have 
pointed out that these provisions (both in the PRA and in earlier legislation) 
undercut poor women’s citizenship rights by forcing them "to surrender basic 
constitutional rights of associational freedom and reproductive privacy as a 
condition of receiving economic assistance for their families" (Mink 1998, 
p.69). While there are exemptions to prevent forced contact with violent 
partners, these may not be properly enforced, especially given the context of 
radical devolution of administration and lack of entitlement. And there are 
sanctions for non-cooperation by clients, but no guarantee that funds will be 
collected.
Anti-immigrant political sentiments, exploited by Republicans in states 
such as California, coincided with their budget-cutting objectives in changing 
welfare provisions to deny many benefits, including Food Stamps, 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and AFDC, to legal immigrants. (The 
PRA had to be at least budget-neutral under the terms of the fiscal requirements 
imposed by the Budget Enforcement Act, but both the Clinton administration 
and the Republicans wanted to use welfare reform for budget deficit reduction; 
see Weaver 1998; Pierson 1998.) Other sources of cost-cutting included 
striking disabled children from SSI and denying Food Stamps to unemployed 
childless workers after three months.
Clinton promised when he signed the original PRA that he would work 
to repeal provisions he had opposed. In the 1997 budget, he was able to make 
good on part of this (Kilbom 1997) by reinstating benefits for legal immigrants 
who had been in the country before the legislation was signed; in addition 
Medicaid was restored to some disabled children. Similarly, the three-month 
limit on Food Stamps to unemployed childless people even if they were looking 
for work has been eased. The Clinton administration has also prevailed in 
mandating that welfare recipients working for the states be paid minimum wage 
(Kilbom 1997), although they work only for their benefit and do not gain 
access to other employment-related benefits such as EITC.
In the early phases of the new policy, states have been helped by an 
unexpected fiscal bonus as block grants were pegged to earlier caseload levels 
while caseloads have decreased substantially since 1996 (Pear 1998). Many 
states are experimenting with expanded casework, training and child care 
services alongside greater efforts to place recipients in jobs or to divert 
potential recipients by requiring work searches before granting aid; they are 
also experimenting with varieties of penalties (Pear 1997; DeParle 1997a). 
Some states have thoroughly overhauled their systems, but others are operating 
systems similar to the old ones with tougher penalties, and, of course, time 




























































































for initiating a system based on requiring work for all adults - more expensive 
per recipient than AFDC had been; while adding significant funds for child care 
subsidies, including to the non-welfare poor, the state has simultaneously 
weakened regulation of child care (DeParle 1997b, 1997c). New York City has 
the largest caseload in the country and an unemployment rate double the 
national average; rather than emphasizing private employment, city officials 
have elected to increase sanctioning and to institute workfare, in which welfare 
recipients seem to be taking the place of city workers (Greenhouse 1998; Toy 
1998). Few fail to point out that a more rigorous test of the new policy will 
come when the economic cycle brings recession, for unlike the old AFDC 
program under which the federal government funding to the states 
automatically expanded as demand grew during downturns, TANF’s block 
grants are fixed and can only be expanded if Congress explicitly authorizes it.
While the situation for many, though not all, people receiving welfare 
has declined with welfare reform, the situation of poor employed parents 
outside the welfare system - including single mothers - has actually improved 
over the last few years. The economic boom of the mid-1990s has reached 
many low-income workers, boosting wages and reducing unemployment, even 
as increased income inequality and employment instability remain problems. 
And returns to employment for low-income people, both women and men, have 
been increased by policies outside of the welfare framework. Most significant 
is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Parents who have (low) earnings - the 
working poor, mothers or fathers - are eligible for a modest benefit, claimed 
through the tax system (and operating along lines similar to Negative Income 
Tax proposals). The EITC, unlike other elements of the US system of social 
provision, has been expanded several times in the 1980s and 1990s, most 
recently and significantly in Clinton’s 1993 budget package (Myles and Pierson 
1997; Weaver 1998).7 Indeed, the EITC outpaced spending on AFDC by the 
early 1990s; in fiscal 1996, EITC expenditures were double what the 
government spent on AFDC (Weaver 1998, p.398). The EITC bolsters the 
incomes of those parents in the paid labor force, thus reflecting the Clinton 
administration’s emphasis on employment. EITC expansion along with the 
increased minimum wage have contributed since 1989 to a 42 per cent increase 
in the earnings of single employed mothers with two children, and a 27 per cent 
increase for single employed mothers with one child (Rebecca Blank 1997, 
cited in Dionne 1998).
7 Childless adults are now also eligible for help under EITC, but get less help than do parents. 
Policymakers are ambivalent about helping the childless - on the one hand, they want to 
eliminate an incentive to childbearing among the poor, but they also want to target help on the 




























































































THE GENDER EFFECTS OF WELFARE REFORM
The set of policy changes grouped under the rubric of "welfare reform" should 
be understood as incorporating several components: social rights, especially as 
they bear on gender power; the institutional arrangements among states, 
markets and families in delivering income and services to citizens and 
residents; and gender stratification, that is gender inequality and gender 
differentiation, especially as this bears on the gender division of labor (Orloff 
1993b; O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999).
Social Rights and Gender Power
Most analysts of the PRA have focused on the loss of entitlement to public 
assistance - the end of social rights for single parents. Social rights are 
significant in that they provide a basis for citizens’ personal and household 
autonomy and may insulate them from exploitable dependencies in families and 
markets (O’Connor 1993; Orloff 1993b; Fraser 1997; Goodin 1985). Welfare 
states are usually understood to be organized on the basis of social citizenship 
rights, that is effective claims on the state for particular benefits or services 
under specified conditions. But most systems retain varying levels of 
discretionary social assistance, which bears greater or lesser resemblance to 
poor relief (Eardley at al 1996). Such aid, while preventing utter destitution, is 
less effective as a counterweight to dominant social forces in markets and 
families than are programs that take the form of social rights. Moreover, lack of 
public provision means that market-generated and other inequalities are not 
ameliorated; without social rights, inequality among women is intensified as 
employers unequally reward women with different capacities and social 
positions.
With the elimination of AFDC and its replacement by TANF, the U.S. 
has decreased the social rights component, and strengthened the discretionary 
components in its system of social provision. Policy has moved away from even 
conditional and categorical entitlement. TANF is unprotected from fiscal and 
political pressures, and needy single parents have no right to assistance. This 
puts single parents in the same situation as other poor people - childless or 
employed - who had not had rights to assistance under the earlier regime in 
which assistance among working-aged adults was limited to the very poorest 
non-employed sole parents, and, after 1988, a small segment of two-parent 
families where both parents were unemployed.
Social rights might be effective against all types of exploitable 
dependencies; proponents of a citizen’s wage have sometimes argued for it in 




























































































in different institutional realms, principally the labor market or 
families/households. Social rights vis-a-vis the labor market are critical for 
workers in capitalist societies. Access to employment and good jobs in 
particular, is also an important right, given that not all social groups have equal 
access to jobs that allow personal independence and entitlement to benefits. 
Rights may also be effective in subverting familial dependencies - not those 
that are the result of a need to be cared for because of age or disability, which 
Kittay (1997) and Fineman (1995) termed "inevitable dependency", but those 
resulting from the economic dependence - or "derived dependence" - that so 
often accompanies caregiving. Welfare benefits, provision of services, and the 
regulation of the labor market and employment affect the capacity to form and 
maintain an autonomous household, a social right which indicates an 
individual’s ability to survive and support their children without being forced to 
marry or enter into other family relationships (Orloff 1993b).8 A key issue for 
contemporary gender relations is whether women - like most men - are in a 
position of being able to choose freely whether to enter marital or other 
relationships, and to some extent, to have a voice in their character. This is a 
matter of securing women’s procedural autonomy - their right to make 
decisions free from coercion, including economic coercion, and does not reflect 
a preference for substantive autonomy over freely-chosen familial ties of 
various sorts (on gender issues and autonomy, see Friedman 1997). Such a 
capacity enhances women’s power vis-a-vis men, especially within marriages 
and families.
There are at least two possible sources for a capacity to form an 
autonomous household: employment, or state provision of income for 
caregiving work. Paid work has been a principal avenue by which women have 
sought to enhance their independence from husbands and fathers in families - 
thereby undermining the breadwinner-housewife family form - and claim full 
status as "independent" citizens in the liberal-democratic polity. Even more 
significantly than programs within the welfare system, U.S. state efforts to open 
good employment opportunities to women through anti-discrimination and 
employment equity policies affect women’s access to work and their
8 Along with Julia O'Connor and Sheila Shaver (1999), I prefer "capacity to form an 
autonomous household", or the shorter "autonomy", to "defamilisation", suggested as an 
analogue for decommodification (McLaughlin and Glendinning 1996; Lister 1997). Some have 
argued that "capacity to form and maintain an autonomous household" does not attend to 
women s situation within marriage. On the contrary, by referring to "capacities" for autonomy, 
one indicates whether people have the resources to choose household forms freely, whatever 
their current situation (in or out of partnerships of various sorts). "Defamilisation" may suggest 
a preference for substantive autonomy - no families - and conjure up exactly the sort of illusions 
about individuals’ capacities to operate without interdependencies for which traditional 




























































































possibilities for personal autonomy. (This does leave them vulnerable to the 
exigencies of depending on labor markets, but this puts them in the same legal 
position as men, but with the continuing, but "private" vulnerabilities stemming 
from their responsibilities for caregiving and domestic work.) State benefits for 
caregivers also give women the capacities to form and maintain households 
without access to a male wage.
Prior to the elimination of AFDC, one could say that the US system 
allowed more independence for mothers vis-à-vis marriage and family than for 
those expected to be workers vis-à-vis the market. US social programs targeted 
on labor market problems like retirement or unemployment all require recent, 
steady attachment to the labor market as conditions of eligibility and also 
involve payment of payroll taxes (O'Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, chap. 4). 
Unemployment programs for working-aged people require ongoing 
demonstration of efforts to find employment, and duration of benefits is quite 
short - six months (though this has been extended to a year during some past 
recessions). AFDC until 1988 did not require work from recipients, even 
though work incentives were in place after 1967; even after 1988, many parents 
were exempted from requirements, or were in counties where public funding 
was inadequate to create the supports for work and therefore, work 
requirements could not be enforced. And AFDC was of much longer duration 
than unemployment - it could continue until recipients' youngest children 
reached age 18. AFDC benefits were never generous but they did offer a 
bottom-line capacity for household independence, which was critical in cases of 
domestic violence, and with arguably positive effects for many women within 
gendered power relations. A single mother could maintain a household without 
access to a male wage and without herself working for pay, although if she 
lived in a large city she almost certainly had to find ways to supplement meager 
welfare benefits (Edin and Lein 1996), particularly after 1980 with the erosion 
of benefits and elimination of provisions allowing women to combine 
employment and welfare. This is no longer the case under TANF. Although 
mothers (and other caregivers) may be able to gain temporary state support, 
there is no entitlement to assistance, and requirements to take paid work are 
part of the plans of all states. In addition, anyone with children claiming social 
assistance is required to cooperate in identifying and finding the absent parent, 
in order to secure child support.
Liberal analysts have typically denied conservative claims that welfare 
encouraged "illegitimacy" or the formation of households by unmarried 
mothers, citing the fact that given declining benefit levels and contracting 
coverage through the late 1980s, AFDC could not be responsible for rising 
rates of non-marital childbearing and proportions of single-mother households 




























































































that the availability of welfare benefits did not allow some of the poorest 
women to have and keep children even in the context of a labor market that did 
not offer them or their potential partners stable jobs with family-supporting 
wages. Thus, it seems quite reasonable to assume that one of the aims of 
welfare reform was precisely to eliminate this option for the poorest women 
(Jencks and Edin 1995). (While it may be true that welfare did not influence 
women’s fertility, it surely must have influenced the capacities of poor women 
to maintain households.) Where liberals and conservatives differed was on 
whether poor mothers and their children should be supported if they were 
employed. Because of high unemployment in many areas with high 
concentrations of welfare recipients (e.g., New York City), and the poor pay, 
instability and lack of health benefits in the majority of the jobs open to most of 
the welfare population, the only way women on welfare can make the transition 
to employment is if government supplemented their incomes, enhanced their 
skills, created job opportunities and helped them gain access to health insurance 
and child care (Spalter-Roth et al l995; Institute for Women’s Policy Research 
1997a). The alternative is the break-up of households. These measures the 
Republican Party has steadfastly opposed, insisting that family formation be 
based on purely "private" efforts. The Clinton administration, in contrast, has 
pursued the strategy of "making work pay" which has applied as well to welfare 
recipients - within the limits set by budgetary constraints and political 
calculations, which has meant very limited efforts in the realm of job creation 
or training, for example. But, as noted above, employment prospects for single 
mothers who can find private employment have brightened somewhat because 
of the EITC and raised minimum wages; whether this trend will continue into 
periods of higher unemployment remains questionable.
The Social Organization of Income and Services
State-society relations, or the institutional relationships among states, markets 
and families, affect the character of gender relations due to their impact on how 
care is organized and supported, and how citizens and residents gain income. 
Analysts have long highlighted the significance of the presence or absence of a 
public component to care, or public supplements to market-based incomes (e.g., 
Siim 1990; Ruggie 1984). But the mere absence of public provision of care 
does not predict which private source - markets, voluntary organizations or 
families - will provide care, nor whether gender divisions of labor will be 
egalitarian. Nor is absence of state-provided income sufficient to know whether 
women (or men) depend on their own employment or partners’ wages for 





























































































With the end of entitlement and constriction of social rights, the "private" 
sphere has been strengthened, as many have noted. But I would stress that it is 
the market, even more than families, that has expanded at the expense of the 
state as the source of income and services, and employment, even more than 
marriage, that has been strengthened as the basis of citizenship claims and of 
individuals’ well-being.
By ending AFDC, mandating work and time limits, and strengthening 
child support, politicians were clearly hoping to decrease the government share 
of families’ income in favor of private sources. And spending on welfare is 
slated to decrease. But other sources of public assistance for families, outside 
the welfare system, have been expanded, notably the Earned Income Tax 
Credit. Indeed, forecasts for federal and state spending on low-income families 
with children - excluding immigrants - show continued increases despite the 
freeze on AFDC expenditures (Weaver 1998, figure 1; much of the increase, 
but not all, comes from Medicaid). And this expansion brings public income 
support to new categories of workers: the EITC represents new commitments to 
assist fathers and two-parent families, who had been excluded from state 
assistance under AFDC and associated policies. (The Republicans oppose it for 
exactly these reasons.) Yet this help comes only to those fathers and mothers 
who are employed; in giving gender-neutral help to employed parents, US 
policy here links income support for families to participation in employment for 
women as well as for men. While in formal terms, this may appear to be the 
equivalent of a (conditional) social right, it is not politically cast as such, and it 
seems unlikely that it is so understood.
Caregiving as a full-time activity has lost its (targeted) state subsidy. If 
parents or others wish to devote their energies full-time to caregiving, they 
must make private arrangements - financing time off from employment from 
savings, depending on other family members’ wages or employer-provided 
benefits. Caregiving as an activity to be combined with employment has been 
given some additional state and federal support, although this is uneven and 
does not take the form of a social right. Outside the welfare sector, most 
Americans depend on markets for child care and other care and domestic 
services, in combination with familial arrangements (O’Connor, Orloff and 
Shaver 1999, chap.3). But the quality of care in the for-profit sector depends 
largely on price, extending inequalities into the provision of caregiving. Indeed, 
the availability of low-cost child care of any sort is problematic in many areas, 
and care for the poorest children - including that of welfare recipients recently 
required to undertake work assignments - is usually of poor quality. Indeed, one 
major source of employment for ex-welfare mothers is child care work, 




























































































In short, labor market position is increasingly important for life chances 
as U.S. citizens and residents are less buffered from social inequalities by state 
policies. Feminist analysis of welfare states in the past has maintained that 
programs which reward labor market participation advantage men over women, 
given that men tend to have jobs with higher pay and better conditions than do 
women. This is still, on average, true. But in the wake of decades of equal- 
opportunity employment and educational policies, in the context of a 
restructured labor market featuring fewer manufacturing and more service jobs, 
there is more variation among both men and women. Labor markets don’t 
advantage men and disadvantage women uniformly. Rather, labor market 
success depends on educational qualifications and cultural capital, as well as 
the extent to which workers are burdened with or free from caregiving 
responsibilities. Many women - including many of us in academia - have rather 
advantaged positions, while more men than in the past are unable to secure jobs 
with family-supporting wages. But the problem with work requirements for 
many welfare recipients is the kind of employment opportunities they have and 
the kind of care they can afford for their children; others have caregiving 
responsibilities of the sort that are inherently difficult (or at the least, 
expensive) to reconcile with employment, especially care of very young 
children or children with disabilities. Of course, these are problems that affect 
people in the whole lower end of the job market.
The contraction of state support disproportionately affects disadvantaged 
populations - African Americans, Latinos, some Asian immigrant groups, 
Native Americans, woman-maintained households and the poor generally - 
because these groups rely on social spending programs for more of their income 
and services than do better-off segments of the population (see, e.g., Smeeding
1997) . More affluent Americans are more likely to depend on employer- 
provided services and benefits (Esping-Andersen 1990; Weir, Orloff, and 
Skocpol 1988; Stevens 1988). AFDC has historically been an important source 
of state support for families in African American and Latino communities, 
given that U.S. policy features no employment guarantees (Weir 1992; Amenta
1998) and various Great Society efforts to pump money into the inner cities 
were not institutionalized (Weir 1995; Brown 1997; Skocpol 1988). Thus, the 
elimination of AFDC cut back on support flowing to these communities of 
color. Again, it is hard to imagine that this was not an intended result of welfare 
reform, although politicians may believe that by eliminating social assistance 
they are forcing people to adopt more "responsible" behaviors "for their own 
good". This is even more the case given that so many believe mistakenly that 
AFDC was collected almost exclusively by people of color, and that politicians, 
some of whom know better, used welfare reform to target particularly long-term 
users of social assistance, who were predominantly African American and 




























































































been no reinstitution of the formally discriminatory welfare provisions of the 
past or the openly, albeit de facto rather than de jure, discriminatory application 
of rules like the "employable mother" provision of the 1950s. Rather, the new 
welfare system is part of the formally "race-neutral" architecture of race 
relations in the post-legal segregation and discrimination age. Biopolitics - by 
which I mean support for populations differentiated in "racial" terms, or lack 
thereof - still goes on, but proceeds through formally race-neutral market 
mechanisms.
Conservatives, like liberals, are attempting to use the regulatory powers 
of the state, rather than direct state provision, to achieve their goals - in this 
case, restoration of a "traditional" gender order centered on the male 
breadwinner/female (unpaid, full-time) caregiver family, an order in which 
women had far less autonomy and capacity to make and carry out decisions 
about their sexuality and reproduction. Liberals have also used such levers, as 
for example, in legislation outlawing gender and racial discrimination and 
sexual harassment. Yet it may be that liberals’ main targets - employers - are 
more vulnerable to such interventions than are the targets of conservatives - 
women, especially poor single mothers. This may strike us as paradoxical, 
given the huge differences in social power between these groups. But because 
corporations depend on the resources of federal contracts, they have a lot to 
lose from not responding to these mandates. But while poor single mothers may 
indeed be vulnerable to these punitive measures, other women are less so, as 
they are earning market wages that protect their decisional autonomy in family, 
marital and reproductive matters (however much we are constrained in terms of 
making fully satisfactory arrangements for balancing employment and 
caregiving).
Stratification and the Gender Division of Labor
A final dimension for assessing the effects of the new welfare reform on gender 
is stratification, concerned with both gender differentiation - that is, the 
reinforcement of the gender division of labour, and inequality - that is, 
differences in access to valued resources. Policies contribute to gender 
differentiation and politically salient gender identities on the systemic level 
(e.g., through creating different programs for labour market and family 
"failures") and individually (e.g., through processes of making claims on the 
state, where men have typically made claims as individuals and workers, 
women often as dependents and family members). The absolute and relative 
amount of support given to citizens and residents and in what social roles they 
are supported - mothers, fathers, parents, members of specific nations or 




























































































significant. Social policy regimes also undermine, reinforce or alter patterns of 
social inequality in the access to valued resources of different groups based on 
gendered identities or position in the division of labour, but also on other social 
differences such as class and race. In turn, these processes affect political 
interests and alliances constituted in the context of existing policies.
American scholars have tended to see a direct link between 
differentiation and inequality. Many analysts identify a "two-tier" welfare state 
with inadequate social assistance programs, AFDC paradigmatically, serving a 
predominantly female clientele who made claims based on their family status 
and relatively more generous contributory social insurance targeting a male 
clientele who made claims based on their status in the labor market (see, e.g., 
Pearce 1986; Nelson 1984, 1990; Fraser 1989). This description of U.S. social 
provision implies that a gendered pattern of political support should have 
emerged around social policies, with women more sympathetic to welfare than 
are men. To some extent, this has occurred, and is reflected in a gender gap in 
which women, particularly non-married women, vote Democratic (partly 
because of their stand as a more pro-social spending party than the 
Republicans) at rates higher than do men. But there are two significant 
problems with this characterization. The first has to do with the way policy is 
said to affect women’s interests; the second concerns the ways in which the 
changes of the 1990s have altered the bases of bifurcation in the U.S., system.
The changes of the 1990s associated with TANF on the one hand and 
EITC on the other has left the system bifurcated between Social Security and 
welfare. If anything, TANF represents a worsening of social assistance by 
undercutting its already limited entitlement, imposing time limits and the rest. 
At the systemic level, the split between social assistance and social insurance 
historically reflected an employment/family dualism. There is in addition a 
strongly gendered character to citizens’ claims-making, which partly overlaps 
with the programmatic split. Women make the majority of family-based claims, 
men’s claims are almost all as workers. But most analysts underestimated the 
significance of wifely claims made by women in the upper-tier social insurance 
programs; indeed, women are the majority of all Social Security claimants and 
there are many more women making claims under Social Security than did 
under AFDC. Mostly-elderly wives or widows and working-aged needy mothers 
are not united merely because both make claims on the basis of "marital or family 
status," rather than as workers. Indeed, marital status as institutionalized in policy 
divides women. Spousal benefits continue to be important within the system of 
old-age provision, particularly for cohorts who came of age before the 1960s and 
1970s. But among younger cohorts, increasing numbers of women are making 
claims as workers under Social Security (including under the rubric of dual 




























































































Feminist descriptions of the "two-tier" U.S. welfare state underestimated 
the significance of the lack of public support for most women. It is true that 
almost all adult recipients of AFDC and TANF were and are women. But 
before they reach retirement age, the majority of women - including over 60% 
of single mothers, like most men, must rely on employer-provided or privately- 
financed services and benefits, or do without them. Women, particularly 
mothers of young children, do sometimes depend at least partially on male 
partners’ income, but labor force participation has become the norm for women 
as well as men - over half of US women with children less than a year old are 
employed. (Unpaid parental leave is guaranteed only for workers in firms with 
more than fifty employees; in contrast, in Scandinavia, most mothers of young 
children remain formally in the labor force, but are actually at home caring for 
children because of their generous paid parental leave system.) Thus, there was 
a significant difference between the political identities of women on welfare - 
seen as being allowed to be stay-at-home mothers by virtue of receiving 
government benefits - and the majority of US women, whose political identities 
are increasingly those of "working (i.e., employed) moms".
Some have argued that single mothers are being singled out for harsh 
treatment in the new work requirements of TANF and that this reflects not a 
commitment to employment for all women,, but special punishment for women 
who flout conventional household and sexual mores. Mink (1998, pp. 105-07) 
says that the PRA created a mandate for single parents to be in work activities, 
while requiring only one parent in two-parent families to be working, thus 
allowing housewifery in two-parent families receiving assistance. Here, she 
says, is proof that the law discriminates against single mothers - by virtue of 
their sexuality and marital status - in denying them the option of full-time 
caregiving. But Mink’s claim appears to be based on a mistaken reading of the 
law, which in fact mandates full-time work (35 hours per week) for one parent 
in two-parent families and part-time work (20 hours per week) for the second 
parent (Institute for Women’s Policy Research 1997a). Single parents will have 
to be in work activities for 30 hours by the year 2000, although states may limit 
required hours per week to 20 if the parent has a child under age six. Although 
Mink is incorrect about the law permitting full-time caregiving for one parent 
in two-parent families, it does appear that such families are to be allowed 
somewhat greater flexibility in making work and caregiving arrangements - 
echoing the greater flexibility such families have outside the welfare system. 
And it is true that half-time work by one parent and full-time work by the other 
better approximates the traditional gender division of labor than does the near- 
full-time work required of single parents. But given the very small proportion 
of two-parent families that are even eligible for and receiving welfare 
assistance (they have never constituted more than 5% of the caseload [Ellwood 




























































































conform-to lab'or market and economic exigencies in determining daregiving 
arrangements. If their income permits, one parent can opt out of the labor 
market. However, many fewer people are in this category than used to be the 
case, given the decline in jobs with family-supporting wages; of course, we see 
these economic exigencies reflected in increasing numbers of dual-earner 
families and the sharp decline of single-earner ones. Welfare reform imposes 
these same exigencies on single mothers.
Welfare reform eliminated claims based on status as a (poor) caregiver. 
While AFDC gave benefits on the basis of family status and associated 
expectations about performance of caregiving work, TANF mandates paid 
employment for all, reflecting a shift in institutionalized assumptions about the 
gender division of labor as women as well as men are expected to take up paid 
employment. EITC also is based on employment. And note that while 
employment and work-related claims are rising among women, men have not 
increased their claims as caregivers, nor have they taken up caregiving work at 
anything like the same rate as women have moved into employment. TANF 
ends entitlement and shrinks benefits for poor mothers, but EITC expands the 
claims poor employed parents can make for material support. And while TANF 
incorporates increased regulation of beneficiaries, seen in requirements for 
employment or work-related activities and in paternity establishment mandates, 
the EITC involves only the surveillance of the tax system. Thus, there is a shift 
at the systemic level from employment/family dualism to a regime in which all 
programs are based on and require participation in labor markets. What 
differentiates programs on the upper from those on the lower tier then is not 
whether they address family or market failures, but which segment of the labor 
market their clients come from. Thus, it seems certain that women’s claims will 
increasingly be as workers, or parent-workers, save for the fairly small 
proportion (4%) of single parents who are widows, many of whom are covered 
as survivors under Social Security.
AFDC recipients have been since the 1960s disproportionately members 
of racial and ethnic minorities and thus welfare reform has been especially 
salient for these groups. (The media emphasized - to the point of distortion - 
African American images in discussions of both poverty and welfare, 
contributing to racializing welfare politics.) But since the PRA was passed, 
whites have been leaving the system faster than have minorities, with the 
consequence that the large majority of welfare recipients are now African 
American and Latino (DeParle 1998). This seems to underline what earlier 
commentators had assumed about racial patterns of welfare use - that whites 
had more resources allowing them to leave welfare after relatively short stints. 
For example Bane (1988) contrasted the situation of white single mothers, who 
tended to use welfare more intensely, for shorter periods of time, and in




























































































response to short-term crises, with African American single mothers, who 
tended use welfare over extended periods of time, in response to the problems 
associated with chronic poverty.
WHY WELFARE REFORM?
Why has the US eliminated certain social rights? Why is employment to be 
expected of women - mothers - as well as men? Why has the state withdrawn 
support to caregiving and reproduction, except when it is accompanied by paid 
labor? To understand the elimination of entitlement for poor mothers and the 
institution of an expectation that mothers be employed we must situate 
commonly-discussed explanatory factors - employer strength, particularly in the 
context of globalization and economic restructuring, women’s increased labor 
force participation, racialized models of motherhood and employment, and 
racial antipathies - in the context of existing policy and processes of policy 
feedback. We will then understand the emergence of a "policy crisis" marked 
by public and elite sentiment that "anything was better than status quo" 
(Weaver 1998) which opened the possibility for ending entitlement as well as 
for requiring employment from mothers receiving public assistance. Three 
features of the policy legacy stand out: the residualism of US social provision, 
reflecting the weakness of the public safety net for the working-aged 
population, the institutionalization of a model of motherhood based on full-time 
caregiving when most women have had to enter employment to sustain 
households with or without partners, and the racialization of welfare.
Many analysts of the welfare state look to the strength, or power 
resources, of working-class forces as the central factor in the development of 
social rights; modifications of this perspective examine the differing class 
alliances underlying different types of welfare states, but continue to identify a 
well-organized working class as critical. Most would agree that unions have 
been relatively weaker than in Europe or the Antipodes, while the lack of a 
main labor, social-democratic or socialist party has been a notable feature of 
US political development. And indeed, the US entered the current period of 
restructuring social provision with a relatively less-developed public system of 
supports for the working-aged population. But where those who might take a 
simplistic view of working-class strength and policy demands as the key factors 
in expanding social rights might expect such a system to engender continuing 
but unfulfilled political support for the expansion of rights, it is clear this has 
not been the pattern of US social politics. Rather, limited social assistance has 
gone along with popular antipathy to welfare. More sophisticated analysts of 
class coalitions and power resources have also examined the political effects of 




























































































"liberal" welfare states (Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987; Esping-Andersen 
1990). Because US labor organization has been uneven, some sectors of the 
working class were able to wrest protections from their employers, creating a 
"private welfare state" for the better-organized segments of workers and their 
families (Stevens 1988), while leaving those who cannot get private coverage 
to a residual public system. This has produced weak political support for 
welfare provision, aside from Social Security, the one US social program which 
covers almost the whole population. But why, given the overall weakness of 
social rights, was the categorical social right to assistance for single mothers to 
be full-time caregivers the one eliminated?
Analysts tend to agree that everywhere the position of employers vis-a- 
vis workers and organized labor has been strengthened over the last two 
decades or so by increased capital mobility and the opening of new low-wage 
labor markets in the developing economies. This has led to the retrenchment 
and restructuring of social programs everywhere, in order to make income 
support more closely conform to the "demands" of the new global economy - 
which is to say, of the employers in that economy (Rhodes 1996; Esping- 
Andersen 1996). And in the US, employers have not been countered by a 
particularly strong labor movement, nor a well-developed social-democratic or 
labor party that might oppose the harshest aspects of economic restructuring. 
While other countries have targeted the long-term unemployed - mainly men - 
in efforts to restructure social provision, the US has gone after single mothers. 
This difference reflects in part the fact that there has been no national system of 
unemployment assistance - to serve as a safety net when social insurance 
coverage is exhausted - in the US as in other OECD countries. This is 
reinforced by differences in the character of the low-skill labor market and 
unemployment levels - the US has more low-skill jobs, many in occupations 
dominated by women, and a lower unemployment rate than other advanced 
industrial democracies. Lack of the "dole" "encourages" participation in that 
low-wage, low-skill labor market for everyone. AFDC could be said to have 
been interfering with the low-wage labor market for women. There is certainly 
quite a lot of truth to these ideas. Again, one can see forces at work to weaken 
the entire fabric of the safety net and social rights, but once more the forces 
behind the specific policy development of eliminating AFDC remain 
underspecified.
Many have made the straightforward point that - in terms of coalitions or 
power resources - poor single mothers on AFDC were a very weak group (e.g., 
Weir, Orloff and Skocpol 1988). While Medicaid involved the interests of 
medical providers or Food Stamps the concerns of agricultural interests, AFDC 
drew on no middle-class or well-organized interests. This was particularly the 




























































































recipients, died down after the early 1970s (Piven and Cloward 1977). Thus, to 
the extent that retrenchment occurred in the 1980s, it fell disproportionately on 
AFDC and allied programs, rather than on those programs which served larger 
constituencies. President Reagan and like-minded governors found it politically 
useful to keep welfare alive, while subjecting it to numerous new and widely 
publicized sanctions and attacks. This also had the merit of being cheaper than 
what most analysts considered to be "real" reform, that is, getting recipients 
into the labor force, with concomitant supports like child care and health 
insurance. Few expected that AFDC could be eliminated without any kind of 
government back-up. And poor single mothers on welfare have been a weak 
constituency for a long time (with the exception of the 1960s period of 
mobilization), so one still needs to ask why in 1996 AFDC was vulnerable not 
just to cutbacks and the addition of deterrent provisions, but to elimination. The 
timing is especially interesting given that elimination of AFDC was not 
considered politically possible under President Reagan (who was certainly 
hostile to welfare), when Republicans had excellent opportunities to change the 
system. Of course, Democratic control of the House was a bulwark against the 
most radical retrenchment under Reagan; a Democratic President in 1995-96 
was not a bulwark against the attempts of a Republican Congress to eliminate 
AFDC. Thus, it is not simply a matter of divided government, but a question of 
what deprived AFDC of political protection even among Democrats in 1996.
Pierson (1994) has argued that even with the decline of groups like trade 
unions whose power resources were central to initiating and expanding welfare 
programs, cutting back welfare provision is difficult because the welfare state 
spawns its own defending constituencies. And even in the case of a marginal 
constituency like poor single mothers, there were constraints on political elites 
that would prevent the complete elimination of the program. Pierson relied on 
the Family Support Act of 1988 to make his case - the FSA did not break out of 
the AFDC framework, but added provisions that looked more radical than they 
were in reality. In his more recent pieces, Pierson (1998; Myles and Pierson 
1997) contrasts the demise of AFDC with the expansion of the EITC; yet he 
does not pinpoint why elimination of AFDC became possible in 1996 beyond 
noting that Clinton was willing to sacrifice AFDC but stood firm on EITC 
when the Republicans (in 1995-96) wanted to cut back on both. True enough - 
but why could Clinton sacrifice AFDC?
There are at least two problems with Pierson’s approach. First, he seems 
to overemphasize constraints on retrenchment and underemphasize the 
potentials for radically restructuring reforms such as the elimination of welfare 
(see also Clayton and Pontusson 1998; Bonoli and Palier 1998). He notes that 
Reagan was able to affect future social policy developments by defunding the 




























































































•  •  ■
welfare, reform, was shaped by fiscal austerity, it .was-certainly, not necessary for 
budget reduction. Rather welfare reform was driven by social politics. Reagan, 
as a popular politician, helped to create and expand the demand for welfare 
reform. The political fact of the Reagan Democrats helped to propel the 
Democratic Leadership Council and then candidate Bill Clinton to their 
inoculation strategy on crime and welfare. Clinton entered office willing to 
consider radical change in AFDC, and committed to a "make work pay" 
approach that would more easily accommodate EITC expansion than the 
defense of the existing welfare system. On the intellectual front, the 
conservative analysts who helped to shape the Republican policy agenda 
reframed the debate about welfare. Meanwhile, precisely because the FSA 
incorporated what expert opinion argued was needed to reduce "dependency," 
and associated social problems, but didn’t do so, it helped to create the ground 
for more radical reforms to be considered. Thus, experts were struck by the rise 
in welfare receipt after FSA; popular opinion was influenced by the picture of 
an essentially unreformed welfare system - and continuing problems of crime, 
poverty and "illegitimacy," particularly in the inner cities, and came to the 
conclusion that existing policy wasn’t working. All of this contributed to the 
emergence of a "policy crisis" - the perceived failure of existing policy, and the 
opening of possibilities to include heretofore excluded policy options (Orloff 
1993a, chap. 1-2). Clinton, left to his own agenda, would not have eliminated 
AFDC, but was committed to time limits and work requirements - policy 
options that had been unthinkable within Democratic circles a decade earlier. 
Republicans’ power in Congress after 1994 forced the issue of eliminating 
AFDC; yet Clinton in the end accepted this. Why was this change, which 
eliminated the social right to full-time caregiving and furthered the 
commodification of mothers’ labor, acceptable? Here is the second problem: 
Pierson (1994), like others, fails to take into account the gendered dynamics 
that made AFDC politically indefensible, even among many of those committed 
to women’s equality.9
9 Here, the comparison to Britain is instructive, although Pierson’s own comparison does not 
draw out the gender issues. Both the UK Income Support system, which supports poor lone 
mothers among other groups, and US AFDC were subjected to similar tinkering in the 1980s, 
but the programs’ fates have diverged more considerably under Clinton and Blair. Clinton’s 
initial election promise to put welfare mothers to work was very popular, and even the 
elimination of AFDC in 1996 did not bring out widespread popular or political outrage. In 
contrast, Blair’s less radical proposals to cut lone mothers’ benefits and to expand work 
incentives were greeted with resistance - in the former case, sufficient to force the 
administration to back down. Mothers’ full-time caregiving, at least until children are in 
school, remains legitimate and politically defensible in Britain, in a context where mothers 
generally are more likely to stay at home full-time or work part-time than in the US 
(OConnor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, chap.3-4). In the US, the clamor for reform remained 
high through the 1980s and 1990s despite the fact that US single mothers exhibit relatively 




























































































Patterns of gender relations bear on the policies affecting women’s 
capacities to form and maintain households, and demands for women’s labor. 
The policy legacy of support to mothering is one factor. One can ask what 
"protects" women from commodification of their labor, in a capitalist system 
that in theory commodifies everyone? Historically, when unconstrained, 
employers have been interested in creating loose labor markets, and have been 
willing to use women’s labor, partly because it was useful in keeping wage 
levels low and undermining working-class organization. They might be 
countered by strong (male-dominated) trade unions or by political elites who 
for reasons of nationalist projects and geopolitical maneuvering might want to 
support reproduction (Jenson 1986; Pedersen 1993). Both sorts of forces were 
implicated in measures to keep women out of the labor market, or in 
subordinate places within it, and to directly support reproduction through social 
provision. In much of Continental Europe, Britain and Australia, such forces 
helped to bolster social provision, creating a safety net in which motherhood 
was supported through near-universal programs.
(I should point out that similar, though not exactly the same, social forces 
are associated with the development of social rights generally. However, one 
thing that differentiates among countries with relatively strong social rights is 
the extent to which women are supported as worker-caregivers or as full-time 
caregivers; this appears to reflect the position of women within the labor force 
as well as within trade unions and social-democratic political organizations. 
Thus, the strongly social-democratic Scandinavian countries have been more 
supportive of women’s employment than the Northern European countries, with 
the exception of France, where there was a historical legacy of support to 
employed mothers [Jenson 1986; Leira 1992; Ruggie 1984]).
Neither of these forces was as strong in early twentieth-century America. 
(This is not to say American elites were not involved in nationalism or 
geopolitical adventuring - but these projects were not articulated with state 
support to national reproduction, given population heterogeneity and the 
strength of employers vis-a-vis state elites.) In spite of this, partly because 
women’s political mobilization was unusually well-developed (Skocpol 1992; 
Gordon 1994; Sklar 1993), matemalist policies did develop in the early 
twentieth-century US, including the mothers’ pensions that were the forerunners
of single mothers received AFDC - a much lower proportion than inBritain, where the 
proportion was about twice as high, and many US mothers cycled between paid work and 
welfare, in effect using AFDC as an unemployment benefit [Spalter-Roth et al 1995]). Yet in 
the US, a program assisting poor full-time caregivers could not call upon such popular and 
elite support. Why? I would contend that a significant part of the answer lies in the specific 





























































































of Survivors’ Insurance and AFDC. Yet for a host of reasons, the universalist 
aspirations of reformers were not realized, and these pensions were fairly 
limited, reaching only the "worthiest" of widows in counties where officials 
were willing to finance them (Skocpol 1992; Orloff 1991). The state-level 
programs were incorporated into the Social Security Act as Aid to Dependent 
Children in 1935, given federal backing, and expanded to cover more single 
mothers. Yet they still functioned as a back-up to the family wage, not as a 
general system of support to mothering and reproduction more generally, as, for 
example, children’s allowances were in many countries (see, e.g., Lake 1992). 
When the widows of covered wage earners were brought under the umbrella of 
Survivors’ Insurance in 1939, ADC was left to cover a clientele of deserted, 
divorced and never-married mothers, seen by many as less "deserving" than the 
widows had been. But again, we face the fact that AFDC has served this weak 
constituency for quite some time, yet it is only recently that forces for 
eliminating the public subsidy to poor single women’s full-time mothering 
could gain the upper hand.
Clearly, the gender division of labor today is quite different than when 
AFDC was established in 1935, with far fewer women staying home full-time 
to care for children and large increases in women’s, especially mothers’, labor 
force participation. This must be a significant part of the explanation for why 
work requirements for single mothers came to be seen as reasonable by 
policymakers, academics and the public. Sole parent benefits - both AFDC and 
Survivors’ Insurance - were established with the aim of allowing white single 
mothers to pursue the distinctive, non-commodified life pattern deemed 
appropriate for other white mothers in order to care for their children. Public 
provision construed single mothers as unemployable, as full-time caregivers 
rather than as potential workers, even after court decisions and political 
challenges of the 1960s and 1970s broke down exclusionary provisions and the 
clientele of AFDC expanded to include women of color. Yet women’s labor 
force participation, particularly among married mothers of children under age 
six, was accelerating at this time (Reskin and Padavic 1994). And indeed, one 
can see reflections of changing attitudes about mothers’ employment in changes 
to AFDC from the 1960s through the 1980s.
Formal work requirements (though quite mild by today’s standards) were 
introduced into AFDC in 1967. (It is interesting to note that proposed new 
supports for breadwinner families, such as the negative income tax, were 
rejected at the same time, as was the expansion of day care services [Quadagno 
1994]; one might view these as U.S. analogues to the Christian-democratic and 
social-democratic policy approaches respectively.) In the 1970s, work 
requirements actually allowed women to combine employment earnings and 




























































































was probably the outcome most favorable for beneficiaries, this line of policy 
development continued to leave the employed poor and most two-parent 
families outside the umbrella of social protection, which in turn left AFDC 
politically vulnerable (Weir, Orloff and Skocpol 1988). Then new restrictions 
against combining paid work and welfare, causing over a tenth of the caseload 
to lose eligibility, were brought in during the early Reagan administration 
(Blank 1997, p.137). But these changes left in place a formal model of 
motherhood based on full-time caregiving, which over the course of the decade 
was increasingly out of sync with the behavior of most mothers (Reskin and 
Padavic 1994, pp.143-145).
The Family Support Act of 1988 at first glance might appear to have 
changed this formally institutionalized model. Many argue that there was a 
"new consensus" involving welfare recipients” employment by the mid-1980s, 
instituted in the Family Support Act, which mandated work or training for 
mothers as well as fathers, with some exemptions (Naples 1997). Single parents 
were required to be at work or in training after their youngest child reached 
three years of age, and states had the option of requiring work or training for 
parents of children as young as one year (U.S. Social Security Administration 
1993, pp.83-97). Still, welfare remained an entitlement under the FSA. But one 
might well argue that the FSA helped to bring on the elimination of AFDC - 
because of its lack of effectiveness in promoting employment among most 
welfare recipients.
The Family Support Act was "welfare reform" within the parameters of 
AFDC - the clientele remained very limited, and work requirements had a fairly 
small impact overall. The provisions of the Family Support Act were 
introduced so slowly, and so many recipients could claim exemptions from 
requirements to be employed, that few in the public saw welfare as fundamentally 
changed. The slow implementation largely reflected fiscal constraints - the fruit of 
Republicans’ and conservative Democrats’ campaigns against taxation and public 
social spending, and of course, the massive budget deficit bequeathed by the 
Reagan administration. To have demanded employment and training from 
everyone under the terms of the FSA would have been much more expensive than 
simply continuing with AFDC as it was. Many states did not even claim their full 
share of federal cost-sharing funds, as this would have necessitated their own 
spending to increase. And even after the Family Support Act, AFDC regulations 
made it difficult to combine on-the-record work and welfare (although most 
women on welfare have depended on some outside income, from family, 
boyfriends or unreported work [Edin and Lein 1996]).
The particular patterns of American women’s labor force participation, 




























































































formal models of motherhood in AFDC and labor force participation patterns 
among women not on welfare made AFDC more problematic politically than 
sole-parent provision in other countries. While part-time work is more 
widespread in other countries, American women are likely to work full-time - 
about 3/4 of all employed women are working full-time - and full-year 
(O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999, table 3.3). Part-time work challenges the 
traditional gender division of labor less than does full-time work. And it was 
the traditional gender division of labor that was institutionalized in AFDC.
Perhaps most critically for AFDC’s lack of political support was that
American women work with less public support, such as child allowances,
child care or paid leaves, than do their counterparts in other parts of the West
where women’s employment is institutionalized in the policy regime (e.g.,
Scandinavia). Those segments of the populace that do not receive any
government welfare (whatever other government largesse they may enjoy) -
that is, a large majority of the non-elderly - must depend on their capacities in
the labor market (or marriage to someone who is employed) to gain access to
valued resources, including health benefits. There is widespread sentiment that
mothers as well as fathers "must" work for most families to maintain
households, or, among the more affluent sectors of the population, to maintain a
middle-class standard of living, including education for children and the like.
Staying at home full-time to care for children has come to be understood as
something to be earned through one’s efforts in the labor market - as a reward
from an employer who gives paid leave - a benefit usually reserved for the best-
off women, or supported through savings, help from parents or at the price of a
normal consumption pattern (e.g., when Christian conservatives argue for
upholding "family values", including housewifery, as requiring resistance to
middle-class consumerism). For example, in the course of debates about family
caps, proponents argued that wage-earners get no supplement when they have
another child, so why should welfare recipients? It was difficult for critics to
mount an effective response to this logic of the market. One suspects that their
task would have been easier had family allowances or other explicit forms of
government support of all citizens’ reproduction ever been instituted in U.S.
(However, such supports usually reflect some commitments to "imagined
communities” of an ethnically homogenous nation, among other things - a
condition never in place in racially- and ethnically-heterogenous America.)
Welfare reform aimed to extend the compulsion of the market to welfare 
. . .  10 recipients. 10
10 Mink (1998) focuses on how welfare reform affects the citizenship rights of women 
depending on public assistance, acutely describing the ways in which their choices are 
constrained by new regulations about paternity establishment, child support, and employment 




























































































Feminists’ interventions tend to support the premise that employment is 
to be expected from all. A "matemalist" option B support to full-time 
caregiving B has been the preference of only a minority of activists and 
academics, even as most feminists, coming from left-liberal position, opposed 
most of the provisions of the 1996 welfare reform bill, especially the end of 
entitlement and lifetime limits, and the targeting of "illegitimacy". But the main 
focus of activists’ attention around the 1996 legislation was the "Domestic 
Violence Option", which permits states to exempt women fleeing battering 
from work requirements; it seems that here the premise is that absent such 
circumstances, and given proper supports such as day care, women’s paid work 
is reasonable (see Institute for Women’s Policy Research 1997b for information 
on welfare reform and domestic violence, including the D.V.O.).
But there is perhaps a larger question to ask about the response of women 
and women’s equality organizations to welfare reform. Why, for example, did 
the proposed elimination of AFDC not call forth popular protests similar to 
those which followed the 1989 Supreme Court Webster decision, when 
hundreds of thousands of women turned out to defend abortion rights? The 
Women’s Committee of One Hundred, one of the few pro-welfare feminist 
lobbying groups to appear when welfare was being debated, tried to mobilize 
under the slogan "a war against poor women is a war against all women." They 
succeeded in drawing out only hundreds in their several demonstrations. In the 
case of defending abortion rights, women across the social spectrum saw this as 
an issue that engaged their interests; in the case of welfare reform, this did not 
happen.11
welfare, by providing an exit option, is a condition for all women’s equality. But this misses 
the politics that have grown around the isolated character of the welfare constituency. More 
women identify as workers/taxpayers than as potential welfare recipients. Some, no doubt, are 
middle-class by virtue of their partners’ income and status; others react to welfare based on 
their own status as employed women. And while women exhibit more generous attitudes than 
do men vis-a-vis social spending, they have not defended "welfare as we knew it". Rather, 
there is sentiment for helping those who try to work, but can’t, supplying affordable child care 
and health care, and the like. 1 would argue that this is precisely because AFDC rules seemed 
to make possible staying at home to care for children at public expense for poor women - 
exactly what isn’t guaranteed to any other mother or parent.
11 Here, one might make the parallel to Sweden’s recent experience of the lack of an explicit 
defense of spousal pension benefits when these were cut back. Apparently, many women felt 
they might need such benefits, as a higher-than-normal number of marriages were registered 
before the deadline (after which the provision granting them would no longer apply). Yet no 
public protest emerged around the issue. Barbara Hobson (1998) explains this with reference to 
the strong assumptions about women’s employment in the Swedish policy regime, which 




























































































Situating welfare reform in the context of wider policy developments - 
such as the regulation of labor markets and policy on reproduction - makes 
clear that it reflects broader gender patterns characterizing the US policy 
regime and gender politics. Gender equality forces have defined employment 
and educational opportunity as central to women’s emancipation. Employment- 
equity legislation has. in combination with strong employer demand for women 
workers, helped to create much-enhanced possibilities for women’s economic 
independence, despite the continuation of a pay gap and occupational sex 
segregation. Reproductive rights are also understood as central to the equality 
project, at least partly because control of one’s reproductive capacities is 
necessary to competing more equally in the labor market. In contrast, social 
protection has been much less significant in post-WW II US gender policy.
The more coercive work requirements in the US and the elimination of a 
social right to assistance are also related to the racialization of welfare politics 
and the racial characteristics of the clientele of sole parent program as 
historically created by the structures of social provision and immigration and 
settlement patterns. The beneficiaries of sole parent programs in other Western 
countries are overwhelmingly white. In the United States, single mothers on 
AFDC were disproportionately minority and indeed, a majority of claimants 
were African-American and Latino; white women were significant proportion 
of AFDC recipients, but, not being concentrated in the ghettoes of major 
metropolises, had less public visibility, and were indeed less likely than 
minority mothers to be on the program for long periods (US Department of 
Health and Human Services Office of Family Assistance 1991, p.6; Bane 
1988). ‘ And the emerging model of motherhood - as encompassing paid work - 
which we see expressed in US policies may relate to the fact that US women of 
color have been held to requirements about combining motherhood and paid 
work that have differed historically from those applying to whites (Bell 1965; 
Collins 1990; Glenn 1992). As the clientele of AFDC was perceived as less 12
12 In the US, analysts distinguished between two or three types of clients - long-term clients 
(often identified as members of an "underclass") and clients using the program only for short­
term needs until they remarried or re-entered the workforce; others identified "cyclers" (Spalter- 
Roth et al 1995) who could not get off welfare permanently due to the character of jobs in the 
low-wage labour market, absence of services and lack of universal medical coverage. The US 
media paid disproportionate attention to the long-term "dependency" of primarily African- 
American and Latina women. Also, more teens and never-married women were on welfare than 
in the social assistance programs of other OECD countries. These indicators point to a greater 
problem of social exclusion in the US, tied to the history of race and racial labor markets, as 
well as to higher levels of economic inequality. Analogous problems exist in the other settler 
nations among the advanced industrial countries, New Zealand, Australia and Canada - 
indigenous populations in these countries are terribly deprived and marginalized, but they form 
a very small proportion of the population and, moreover, are geographically concentrated away 




























































































white, the standards applicable to women of color are being made requirements 
of all welfare programs, a trend reinforced by the increasing proportions of 
women of all races and ethnic groups entering the labor force. Again, the 
change in institutionalized expectations for paid work are explicable by these 
long-standing differences in views about white women versus women of color, 
but the end of entitlement, and the preceding ratcheting up of onerous 
requirements in AFDC, are more severe than institutionalizing expectations 
about employment. Here, I believe we do need to invoke biopolitics, and the 
unwillingness of some white elites and white voters to give material support to 
the reproduction of people of color.13 This represented a set of sentiments 
available for mobilization by politicians, and certainly contributed to the 
campaign against welfare and "welfare queens" waged by the Republicans over 
the 1980s, and formed the context for the Democrats move to the right on 
"wedge issues".
The welfare rolls began to rise again soon after passage of the FSA, 
reversing years of declining coverage, and the social ills which concerned 
policymakers - nonmarital childbearing and lack of employment - continued 
unabated. And while most liberal analysts continued to propose what was 
essentially tinkering with AFDC, certain conservatives, Charles Murray and his 
intellectual compatriots most significantly,, argued that elimination of social 
provision was more humane than the continuation of AFDC under any 
circumstances. While, among elites, conservative thinking about welfare was 
gaining sway, there was not a public consensus on needed changes - but public 
opinion polls after the 1994 election "showed that the public preferred any 
possible package of reforms over the status quo" (Weaver 1998, p.375). 
Liberals like Clinton and Ellwood inadvertently may have reinforced the 
conservatives’ claim that AFDC was worse than any alternative by promising to 
"end welfare as we know it". Thus, there was a continuing demand for reform, 
and mounting receptivity among the electorate for radical solutions to the 
"welfare mess".
Indeed, one might argue that the elimination of AFDC became inevitable 
once Clinton made his famous promise. Like Cold Warrior Richard Nixon 
opening the door to Communist China, Clinton’s embrace of a stance that had 
formerly been anathema in his party changed political dynamics irrevocably. 
Although Democrats sought to retain control of the welfare issue, the call to 
end welfare was seized on mainly by Republicans, who moved the debate far to 
the right - to outright elimination of a right to assistance. After the Republicans
13 Given the surfeit of low-wage workers available in the US and worldwide, one might argue 
that support to their reproduction will be seen as superfluous at best by economic elites and the 




























































































captured the House of Representatives in 1994, President Clinton was forced by 
his political concerns into signing a Republican welfare bill that was much 
more restrictive and less generous that his own, unsuccessful, plan.
With the end of AFDC, poor mothers and other caregivers of children no 
longer have a social right to assistance. Given the emphasis placed on women’s 
workplace access and equality by feminist groups, one might well ask whether 
it had been in the interests of poor women to be enabled to stay at home by 
welfare payments. Earlier feminist critics of the welfare state indeed focused on 
the negative aspects of reinforcing women’s domesticity in this way. Certainly, 
there are drawbacks for women accompanying withdrawal from the labor force 
to care for their children full time, even for a few years (accommodating caring 
by working part time also "costs," though not as much; see, e.g., Joshi 1992). 
However, it is hard to champion paid work as reflecting the gender interests of 
women if it is in substandard work settings and brings no access to 
employment-related benefits or in the absence of sufficient support services, 
particularly without a second adult helping out, and, in the U.S. especially, in 
dangerous neighborhoods. Yet I do not believe there is any likelihood that we 
will return to a policy which supports full-time caregiving for anyone, beyond a 
short period after the birth of a child. Moreover, AFDC was deeply flawed, not 
least because of its restricted coverage. While AFDC at least provided medical 
coverage and a subsistence to non-employed single-parent families, the 
employed poor and working classes were left with no public support 
whatsoever. 1 would argue that the best option today is to be found in 
supporting better treatment for single mothers by accepting that they will be 
workers, and campaigning for better supports for all workers, especially those 
with children (for a similar argument, see, e.g., Bergmann and Hartmann 1995; 
Greenberg and Skocpol 1997).
Ann Shola Orloff 
Department of Sociology 
Northwestern University 
1810 Chicago Avenue 
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